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Abstract: The U.S. tax policy on health insurance is regressive because it favors only those offered group 
insurance through their employers, who tend to have a relatively high income. Moreover, the subsidy takes 
the form of deductions from the progressive income tax system, giving high-income earners a larger 
subsidy. To understand the effects of the policy, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model with 
heterogenous agents and an endogenous demand for health insurance. We use the Medical Expenditure 
Panel Survey to calibrate the process for income, health expenditures, and health insurance offer status 
through employers and succeed in matching the pattern of insurance demand as observed in the data. We 
find that despite the regressiveness of the current policy, a complete removal of the subsidy would result 
in a partial collapse of the group insurance market, a significant reduction in the insurance coverage, and 
a reduction in welfare coverage. There is, however, room for raising the coverage and significantly 
improving welfare by extending a refundable credit to the individual insurance market. 
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Our paper studies the e®ects of the tax policy on the health insurance decision of households in
a general equilibrium framework with a major innovation to previous work in the ¯eld, namely,
the introduction of an endogenous health insurance decision and adverse selection. We then
provide an example of a regressive policy that improves welfare. The premium for employer-
based health insurance in the U.S. is both income and payroll tax deductible while individual
health insurance purchased outside the workplace does not o®er this tax break.1 This tax policy
is regressive in two ways. First, data indicate that labor income is positively correlated with the
access to employer-based health insurance, thus workers with higher income are more likely to
enjoy the tax break. We call this horizontal inequality. Second, conditional on being covered
by employer-based health insurance, the policy is regressive because the progressive income tax
code in the U.S. implies that individuals with higher income in a higher marginal tax bracket
receive a larger tax break than those in a lower tax bracket. We call this vertical inequality.
We show that despite its regressiveness this tax policy is welfare improving. Our main result
relies on the key di®erence between employer-based and individual health insurance. The former,
also called group insurance, is required by law not to discriminate among employees based on
health status, while in the latter insurance companies have an incentive to price-discriminate and
o®er lower rates to individuals in better health status. Insurance outside the workplace therefore
o®ers less pooling and thus less risk-sharing than the employer-based insurance. Pooling in
the group insurance, however, relies on healthy agents voluntarily cross-subsidizing agents with
higher health expenditures. Taking away the tax subsidy thus encourages adverse selection.
Speci¯cally, healthy agents leave the group insurance, thereby causing a collapse of pooling in
the group market and an overall welfare loss due to an increased exposure to the expenditure
risks. We also study if alternative tax reforms can help eliminate some of the regressiveness while
maintaining the pooling in the group
Our work is a contribution to the literature of dynamic equilibrium models with heterogenous
agents. The classic work of Bewley (1986), _ Imrohoro¸ glu (1992), Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari
(1994) has created a large literature studying uninsurable labor productivity risk. Many recent
papers investigated issues such as risk-sharing among agents, wealth and consumption inequality
and welfare consequences of market incompleteness.2 We add to this literature by setting up a
model in the tradition of Aiyagari (1994) but with idiosyncratic health expenditure risk which
1The value of the subsidy is substantial, about $133 billion in the year 2005, according to the O±ce of
Management and Budget. The origin of the tax deductibility lies in the price and wage controls the federal
government imposed during the World War II. Companies used the employer-provided health bene¯ts as a non-
price mechanism to compete for workers that were in short supply, thereby circumventing the wage controls.
Subsequent to lifting the price and wage controls, employers kept providing health plans partly because they
could be ¯nanced with pre-tax income. The tax deductibility was extended to health insurance premiums of
self-employed individuals in 1986.
2See for example Fern¶ andez-Villaverde and Krueger (2004) and Krueger and Perri (2005).
1is partially insurable according to the endogenous insurance decisions.
Health expenditure shocks have been helpful in adding realism to Aiyagari-type models. For
example, Livshits, Tertilt, and MacGee (2007) and Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and R¶ ³os-Rull
(2005) argue that health expenditure shocks are an important source of consumer bankruptcies.
Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) add health expenditure risk to Aiyagari's model and ar-
gue that the social safety net discourages savings by low income households. Only high income
households accumulate precautionary savings to shield themselves from catastrophic health ex-
penditures. Palumbo (1999) and De Nardi, French, and Jones (2005) incorporate heterogeneity
in medical expenses in order to understand the pattern of savings among the elderly. Scholz,
Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006) also include uncertain medical expenditures for retirees to
study retirement savings.
What is common among papers in the existing macro-literature is that the health insurance
decision is absent from the model and consequently a household's out-of-pocket expenditure pro-
cess is treated as an exogenous state.3 Our paper is also related to the literature on income
taxation in incomplete markets with heterogeneous agents, particularly the macroeconomic im-
plication and welfare and distributional e®ects of alternative tax systems.4 A tax reform will
generate a new path of factor prices, which a®ects heterogeneous agents in di®erent ways.
In our paper we set up an overlapping generation general equilibrium model with endogenous
health insurance demand to evaluate the merits of the tax-deductibility of group health insur-
ance. Within our micro-founded framework, we conduct policy experiments based on optimized
decision rules, which enables us to compare the welfare e®ect of policy experiments as well as
the changes in the insurance demand. Moreover, we can take into account important general
equilibrium e®ects. For example, our model can evaluate the ¯scal consequences of policy re-
forms. Eliminating the subsidy results in a lower tax rate on other sources of income which
can reduce distortions in other sectors, or alter the demand for social welfare programs such as
Medicaid. It is di±cult to compute welfare consequences of these policy experiments without an
optimizing model of the household. Changing the tax treatment of health insurance premiums
will also a®ect agents' savings behavior (and thus the aggregate capital stock and factor prices)
directly through marginal taxes as well as indirectly because health insurance in°uences the pre-
cautionary savings motives. In each policy experiment, we ¯rst compute a steady state outcome
to analyze the long-run e®ect and then explicitly compute the transition dynamics between the
3Papers that deal with health insurance policy outside of a heterogenous agent framework include Kotliko®
(1989) and Gruber (2004). Kotliko® builds an OLG model where households face idiosyncratic health shocks and
studies the e®ect of medical expenditures on precautionary savings. He considers di®erent insurance schemes, such
as self-payment, insurance, or Medicaid, which agents take as exogenously given. In our paper, we combine all
three of them into one model and let households decide how they want to insure against health expenditure shocks.
Gruber measures the e®ects of di®erent subsidy policies for non-group insurance on the fraction of uninsured by
employing a micro-simulation model that relies on reduced-form decision rules for households.
4See for example Domeij and Heathcote (2004), Casta~ neda, D¶ ³az-Gim¶ enez, and R¶ ³os-Rull (2003), Conesa and
Krueger (2006), Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2006).
2calibrated benchmark and the new steady state implied by an alternative policy in order to
accurately assess the welfare consequences on the current generations.
Our quantitative analysis shows that completely removing the tax subsidy would substantially
decrease the health insurance coverage and negatively a®ect welfare because of a partial collapse
of the group insurance market. This is due to adverse selection, whereby the healthy agents drop
out of the group insurance market as they are no longer willing to subsidize higher risk agents
in the same pool. This °ight out of group insurance and into the individual contract with less
pooling will be exacerbated by the increase in the group insurance premium, once the healthiest
agents drop out. Indeed, there is a historical example of such a collapse of a pooling insurance
contract in the face of competition from other contracts with price discrimination. In the 1950s
Blue Cross and Blue Shield o®ered individual insurance that was community-rated, i.e., it was
o®ered at a price independent of health conditions. However, other companies soon entered the
market, screening applicants and o®ering lower rates to relatively healthy agents. Blue Cross and
Blue Shield were left with the bad health risks and were forced to discontinue the community
rating in the individual insurance market.5 A similar mechanism of adverse selection is at work
in our model.
At this point a reader may wonder how we reconcile our main result with recent research that
has found very little evidence of adverse selection.6 Our results do not contradict these ¯ndings
at all! Quite the opposite, in our benchmark economy we ¯nd almost no adverse selection in
the employer provided health insurance. We show that one of the reasons for the absence of
adverse selection in group health insurance is the current tax treatment of health insurance that
facilitates the risk-sharing we observe.
There are other ways to reduce inequality inherent in the current policy without completely
removing the tax subsidy. We show that eliminating vertical inequality by removing the regres-
siveness of tax bene¯ts will reduce the bene¯t of group insurance for those facing a high marginal
tax rate and increase the bene¯t for those with a low tax rate.
To restore horizontal equity and provide a level ¯eld irrespective of access to group insurance,
there are many paths the government could take. Various reform proposals are being debated
in the policy arena, such as extending the deductibility to the non-group insurance market or
providing a credit for any insurance purchase. We simulate our economy to evaluate such reforms
and ¯nd they are e®ective in raising the insurance coverage and improving welfare to varying
degrees. An increase in the coverage is bene¯cial, despite the general equilibrium e®ect of lower
aggregate output and consumption, due to the reduction in the precautionary savings. We ¯nd
that a reform that provides a lump-sum subsidy to those without employer-based insurance to
purchase individual insurance e®ectively reduces the regressiveness of the system and increases
the coverage without triggering a °ight out of the group insurance market, thereby maintaining
5Thomasson (2004) provides a historical background of the events.
6See, for example Cardon and Hendel (2001) and Bajari, Hong, and Khwaja (2006).
3the bene¯ts of pooling risk.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple two-period model to highlight
the intuition of our results. Speci¯cally, it shows that the total welfare e®ect of a subsidy on a
group insurance plan is ambiguous: on the one hand the subsidy enhances risk-sharing among
those agents o®ered a group insurance plan and on the other hand it regressively redistributes
from those o®ered group insurance to those without an o®er. Section 3 introduces the full
dynamic model. Section 4 details the parameterizations of the model. Some parameters will be
estimated within the model by matching moments from the data and others will be calibrated.
Section 5 presents the numerical results of the computed model both from the benchmark and
from policy experiments. In Section 6 we consider extensions of the model and discuss several
sensitivity analyses of the benchmark calibration. The last section concludes.
2 A simple two-period model
We start with a simple two-period model with endogenous health insurance demand to provide
the intuition of our results. Speci¯cally, we demonstrate that changing the tax treatment of the
health insurance premium has ambiguous welfare e®ects; depending on the parameter values a
subsidy on the group health insurance premium can have negative or positive welfare e®ects.
Many assumptions we employ in this basic model for the sake of simplicity will be relaxed in the
subsequent section.
Suppose there are two ¯rms and a measure one of individuals who live for two periods and
consume a single consumption good in the second period. Assume that ex-ante identical agents
face an idiosyncratic health risk. With some probability, agents will fall into a bad health state
and must pay health expenditures equivalent to a unit of the consumption good in period 2.
In period 1; agents observe a noisy signal of their health expenditure shock. Speci¯cally, a
measure 1
2 has a probability pH of su®ering from the expenditure shock and the remaining agents
have a probability pL, where pH > pL. Assume that all agents have access to the market of
individual health insurance (IHI) where a competitive and risk-neutral insurance company o®ers
an insurance contracts at price pi based on the observed signal i 2 fL;Hg. Notice that all
risk-averse agents will choose to sign up for insurance.
Agents receive a life-time labor income Y from a ¯rm for whom they work. In period 1; one
half of the agents are matched with a ¯rm of type 1 that o®ers a group health insurance (GHI)
contract at price pGHI to all employees independent of their signals. Workers in ¯rm 1, therefore,
have a choice between the GHI and the IHI contract. The other half of the agents work in a ¯rm
of type 2 that does not o®er such a group insurance contract and thus has access only to the IHI
contract.
Consider a policy of providing a subsidy s for the purchase of group insurance contract.
4Clearly agents in ¯rm 1 will sign up for the GHI contract if the price for insurance is lower




one can show that all agents in ¯rm 1, even those with signal pL, sign up for GHI: the average
expenditure per agent is
¡
pH + pL¢
=2 and the premium is pGHI =
¡
pH + pL¢
=2 ¡ s = pL; just
low enough to make even the healthy individuals with pL indi®erent between signing up for the
group insurance and purchasing an individual contract. Also notice that for any subsidy value
smaller than s, healthy agents would leave the GHI contract and instead go to the individual
market. This would induce the exact same phenomenon as in the 1950s Blue Cross and Blue
Shield example. Healthy agents seek insurance in the individual market, which leaves only the
bad risks in the group contract: the same adverse selection downward spiral that plagued Blue
Cross and Blue Shield.
Assume that the government imposes a lump-sum tax on the workers in ¯rm 1 to ¯nance the
cost of subsidy, i.e. ¿ = s. Such a policy has no e®ect on the agents in ¯rm 2 so that we can
isolate and focus on the redistributional e®ect of the policy among those with the GHI o®er in
¯rm 1.
consumption
no subsidy with subsidy change
pL Y ¡ pL Y ¡ pL ¡ s ¡s
pH Y ¡ pH Y ¡ pL ¡ s +s
The subsidy removes a mean-preserving spread in consumption, thus the welfare e®ect of a
subsidy policy on the agents in ¯rm 1 evaluated in terms of consumption equivalent variation
is unambiguously positive. To quantify the welfare e®ect of such a policy, assume that agents
derive utility from the consumption in the second period according to the preference u(c) =
c1¡¾=(1 ¡ ¾) with ¾ = 3, earn the life-time income Y = 2 and face the health risk as shown
in the table below. The magnitude of the welfare gain depends on the variance of the health
shocks that the policy helps alleviate: The greater the uncertainty of the health status, the larger
are the potential welfare gains of the subsidy. As shown in the next table, the welfare change
(measured in terms of consumption equivalent variation) rises with the probability pH.8
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
pL 0.10 0.10 0.10
pH 0.15 0.20 0.30
welfare e®ect +0.027% +0.110% +0.464%
7For simplicity we assume that whenever agents are indi®erent between the two contracts they pick the GHI.
8As we demonstrate in the full dynamic model, the removal of the subsidy not only induces the healthy agents
to leave the group insurance market, but may also leave a sizeable number of unhealthy agents uninsured, for
example in the presence of borrowing constraints. In this case the welfare e®ects are signi¯cantly larger.
5Income uncertainty and regressive policy: Now assume that in addition to the uncertainty
about health expenditures, agents are heterogeneous in income as well. A ¯rm of type 1 pays
a wage Y1 and type 2 pays Y2, where Y1 ¸ Y2, i.e., people with a GHI o®er tend to earn
more.9 Notice that since people earn more at ¯rm 1, the subsidy is a regressive policy from the
perspective of an agent before the realization of the income shock.10 Consider the same policy
of providing the subsidy for GHI, namely a subsidy s just large enough to make the agents with
a low health risk sign up for the contract, i.e. s = (pH ¡ pL)=2.
In contrast to the example above, assume that the subsidy is ¯nanced by a lump-sum tax on
every agent in the economy, even those in ¯rm 2.11 With ¾ = 3 and pL and pH set at 0.1 and
0.2, respectively, we ¯nd that the welfare e®ect of the subsidy depends on the degree of income
uncertainty:
Case A Case B
No income uncertainty Income uncertainty
Y 1 2.0 2.5
Y 2 2.0 2.0
Welfare e®ect
all (ex-ante) +0.024% -0.425%
o®ered GHI +1.462% +1.132%
not o®ered GHI -1.354% -1.354%
This exercise highlights the tradeo® that a benevolent government faces between creating
more risk-sharing among agents who are o®ered a GHI contract and regressive redistribution
between agents of di®erent income levels. On the one hand there is a welfare gain from increased
risk-sharing among agents employed by ¯rm 1. On the other hand, there is a welfare loss from
the regressive tax policy. If the wages in the two ¯rms are identical as in case A, the positive
e®ect of increased risk-sharing in ¯rm 1 dominates even if it is ¯nanced with the lump-sum tax
on every agent, causing an ex-ante welfare gain. In contrast, if the income in ¯rm 1 is large
enough as in case B, the welfare loss from lower risk-sharing over income uncertainty dominates
ex-ante welfare. The marginal utility of workers in ¯rm 1 with high income is too low and thus
the welfare gain from pooling in the GHI contract is smaller than the welfare loss of agents in
¯rm 2.
As we demonstrate with this basic model, the welfare e®ect of the group insurance subsidy
9In the panel data we present below we ¯nd that people with a GHI o®er have a labor income about 2.15
times higher than those without a GHI o®er.
10As mentioned in the introduction, in the real world the GHI tax subsidy also displays regressiveness among
those o®ered. A progressive income tax means a larger tax bene¯t for those with higher income. To keep the
example as simple as possible we abstract from heterogeneity of income within the ¯rms.
11We choose the lump-sum tax for simplicity and refer the introduction of a realistically modeled tax function
to the full dynamic model in the subsequent sections.
6is ambiguous. Since this subsidy is regressive, it impedes risk-sharing between agents in the
two ¯rms. However, a subsidy can overcome the adverse selection problem in the GHI contract
and thus enhance risk-sharing among agents within ¯rm 1. Without the subsidy, healthy agents
in ¯rm 1 are unwilling to pool their risk with unhealthy agents and rather chase the lower
insurance premium. This behavior is ex post optimal but lowers ex ante welfare.12 Determining
the welfare consequences of abolishing the tax-deductibility under the current U.S. tax code
therefore requires a quantitative exercise based on a carefully calibrated dynamic model. The
basic model provides intuition, but fails to capture key aspects of the economy and institutions
that make the insurance markets in the U.S. unique. The agents' insurance demand depends
on the magnitude and persistence of the health risks and income uncertainty they face over
their life-cycle and the gain from the policy intervention depends on the calibration of such
risks. Moreover, increased exposure to the health risk induces risk-averse agents to save more for
precautionary reasons. In general equilibrium, this changes factor prices and ultimately a®ects
welfare. The basic model discussed does not capture these features of the U.S. economy and
health care market. In the next section, we present a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium
model that achieves this task.
3 The full dynamic model
3.1 Demographics
We employ an overlapping generations model with stochastic aging and dying. The economy is
populated by two generations of agents, the young and the old. The young agents supply labor
and earn the wage income. Old agents are retired from market work and receive social security
bene¯ts.13 The young agents become \old" and retire with probability ½o every period and old
agents die and leave the economy with probability ½d. We will later calibrate the probabilities
so as to match the current age structure of the two generations.
We assume the population remains constant. Old agents who die and leave the model are
replaced by the entry of the same number of young agents. The initial assets of the entrants are
assumed to be zero. This demographic transition pattern generates a fraction of
½d
½d+½o of young
people and a fraction of
½o
½d+½o of old people. All bequests are accidental and they are collected
by the government and transferred to the entire population in a lump-sum manner.
12One way to circumvent this problem would be to force agents to sign insurance contracts before they ¯nd out
their signal. This corresponds to health insurance contracts that bind healthy agents to a pooling arrangement.
This can be achieved by either signing long-term contracts or the type of contracts Cochrane (1995) suggests.
Alternatively, the government could impose a national health care system.
13In the computation, we distinguish the old agents who just retired in the previous period from the rest of
the old agents and call the former as \recently retired" agents and the latter as \old" agents. The distinction
between the two old generations is necessary because recently retired agents have a di®erent state space in terms
of health expenditure payment from the rest of the old agents as we discuss below.
73.2 Endowment
Agents are endowed with a ¯xed amount of time and the young agents supply labor inelastically.
Their labor income depends on an idiosyncratic stochastic component z and the wage rate w,
and it is given as wz. Productivity shock z is drawn from a set Z = fz1;z2;:::;zNzg and follows a
Markov process that evolves jointly with the probability of being o®ered employer-based health
insurance, which we discuss in the next subsection. Newly born young agents make a draw from
the unconditional distribution of this process.
3.3 Health and health insurance
In each period, agents face an idiosyncratic health expenditure shock x.14 Young agents have
access to the health insurance market, where they can purchase a contract that covers a fraction
q(x) of the medical cost x. Therefore, with the health insurance contract, the net health expen-
ditures will be (1 ¡ q (x))x, while it will cost the entire x without insurance. Notice that we
allow the insurance coverage rate q to depend on the size of the medical bill x. As we discuss in
the calibration section, q increases in x due to deductibles and copayments. Agents must decide
whether to be covered by insurance before they discover their expenditure shock.
Agents can purchase health insurance either in the individual market or through their em-
ployers. We call a contract purchased in the ¯rst market \individual health insurance (IHI)" as
opposed to \group health insurance (GHI)" purchased in the workplace. While every agent has
access to the individual market, group health insurance is available only if such a bene¯t plan is
o®ered by the employer. Notice that we assume that the coverage ratios q are the same across
the two types of contracts.
In our model we assume that there is an exogenous probability of getting a GHI o®er.15
Speci¯cally, the probability of being o®ered health insurance at work and the labor productivity
shock z evolve jointly with a ¯nite-state Markov process. As shown in section 4.1, we do this
because ¯rms' o®er rates di®er signi¯cantly across income groups. Moreover, for workers, the
availability of such bene¯ts is highly persistent and the degree of persistence varies according to
the income shocks. The transition matrix ¦Z;E has the dimension (Nz £ 2) £ (Nz £ 2), with
an element pZ;E(z;iE;z0;i0
E) = prob(zt+1 = z0;iE;t+1 = i0
Ejzt = z;iE;t = iE). iE is an indicator
function, which takes a value 1 if the agent is o®ered group health insurance and 0 otherwise.
If a young agent decides to purchase group health insurance through his employer, a constant
14An alternative way would have been to model health expenditures endogenously. For example Grossman
(1972) models health much like a durable good that can depreciate, but can also be replenished at a cost. We did
not feel that endogenizing health expenditures that way adds much to our model. Our main result is that there is
a rationale to subsidize group health insurance to keep those with low health expenditure in the group insurance
pool. Explicitly modeling health gives the same result: The government should subsidize group insurance to keep
those with low health depreciation in the group insurance pool.
15An extension would be to allow agents to choose between two sectors, one that does and one that does not
o®er GHI. In section 6 we elaborate on how this changes our results.
8premium p must be paid to an insurance company in the year of the coverage. The premium is
not dependent on prior health history or any individual states. This accounts for the practice
that group health insurance does not price-discriminate the insured by such individual charac-
teristics.16 We also allow the employer to subsidize the premium. More precisely, if an agent
works for a ¯rm that o®ers employer-based health insurance bene¯ts, a fraction Ã 2 [0;1] of the
premium is paid by the employer, so the marginal cost of the contract faced by the agent is only
(1 ¡ Ã)p.17 In the individual health insurance market, we assume that the premium is pm (x),
that is, the premium depends on the current health expenditure state x.18 This re°ects the
practice that in contrast to the group insurance market, there is price discrimination in the indi-
vidual health insurance market. Speci¯cally, IHI contracts normally are often contingent on age,
prior conditions and speci¯c habits (such as smoking) or even rule out payment for preexisting
conditions.
Health insurance companies are competitive. They charge premium p and pm (x) that pre-
cisely ¯nance the expenditures covered by the contract. Insurance companies are free to o®er
contracts di®erent individuals in both group and individual markets and therefore we impose the
no-pro¯t conditions in each type of contract and there is no cross-subsidy across contracts. The
premiums for group and individual insurance contracts (for each health status) satisfy:
(1 + r)p =
(1 + ÁG)
R P
x0 py (x0jx)x0q (x0)iEi0
HI (s)¹(sjj = y)ds R
iEi0
HI (s)¹(sjj = y)ds
(1)
(1 + r)pm (x) =
(1 + ÁI)
R P
x0 py (x0jx)x0q (x0)(1 ¡ iE)i0
HI (s)¹(sjx;j = y)ds R
(1 ¡ iE)i0
HI (s)¹(sjx;j = y)ds
8x (2)
where ÁG and ÁI denote a proportional markup for the group insurance contract and individual
insurance contract respectively. We assume that this cost is a waste (`thrown away into the
ocean') and does not contribute to anything.
We assume that all old agents are enrolled in the Medicare program. Each old agent pays a
¯xed premium pmed every period for Medicare and the program will cover the fraction qmed (x)
16Clearly, ¯rms have an incentive to price-discriminate, i.e., charge a higher insurance premium to individuals
with an adverse health condition, but labor regulations prevent such discrimination. U.S. Department of Labor
Release 01-14 states: \[N]ondiscrimination provisions generally prohibit a group health plan or group health
insurance issuer from [...] charging an individual a higher premium than a similarly situated individual based
on a health factor. Health factors include: health status, medical condition (including both physical and mental
illnesses), claims experience, receipt of health care, medical history, genetic information, evidence of insurability
(including conditions arising out of acts of domestic violence), and disability."
17Notice that the subsidy, too, could be modeled as the outcome of a worker-¯rm bargaining process. However,
we assume that the employer subsidy is given exogenously, calibrated in the benchmark to the value observed in
the data. In the policy experiments we rely on empirical estimates on how employers alter the generosity of the
subsidy when the premium changes in equilibrium. See Section 5.2 for details.
18There are other important features and issues in the individual insurance market. In particular, limited
information of insurers on the health status of individuals could cause adverse selection, raise the insurance
premium and shrink the market as analyzed in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Other general issues that pertain
to both group and individual insurance markets include coverage exclusion of pre-existing health conditions,
overuse of medical services due to generous deductible and copayments (moral hazard), etc. We do not model
them in the benchmark economy in order to keep the model tractable.
9of the total medical expenditures. Young agents pay the Medicare tax ¿med that is proportional
to the labor income. We assume that old agents do not purchase individual health insurance
and their health costs are covered by Medicare and their own resources, plus social insurance if
applicable.19
Health expenditures x follow a ¯nite-state Markov process. For the two generations j =







Nxg, with a transition matrix ¦j
x. We assume that if a young agent becomes old, he
makes a draw from the set Xo according to the transition matrix of the old agents, conditional
upon the state in the previous period.
3.4 Preferences
Preferences are assumed to be time-separable with a constant subjective discount factor ¯. In-
stantaneous utility from consumption is de¯ned as a CRRA form, u(c) = c1¡¾
1¡¾ , where ¾ is the
coe±cient of relative risk aversion.
3.5 Firms and production technology
A continuum of competitive ¯rms operate a technology with constant returns to scale. Aggregate




where K and L are the aggregate capital and labor e±ciency units employed by the ¯rm's sector
and A is the total factor productivity, which we assume is constant. Capital depreciates at rate
± every period.
As discussed above, if a ¯rm o®ers employer-based health insurance bene¯ts to its employees,
a fraction Ã 2 [0;1] of the insurance premium is paid at the ¯rm level. The ¯rm needs to adjust
the wage to ensure the zero pro¯t condition. The cost cE is subtracted from the marginal product
of labor, which is just enough to cover the total premium cost that the ¯rm has to pay.20 The
19Many old agents purchase various forms of supplementary insurance, but the fraction of health expenditures
covered by such insurance is relatively small and it is only 15% of total health expenditures of individuals above
age 65 (MEPS, 2001), and we choose to assume away the individual insurance market for the old, because the
old generation is not the primary focus of our model. 97% of people above age 65 are enrolled in Medicare and
the program covers 56% of their total health expenditures. For more on the health insurance of the old, see for
example Cutler and Wise (2003).
20The assumption behind this wage setting rule is that a ¯rm does not adjust salary according to individual
states of a worker. A ¯rm simply employs e±ciency units optimally that consist of a mix of workers of di®erent
states according to their distribution. The employer-based insurance system with a competitive ¯rm in essence
implies a transfer of a subsidy from uninsured to insured workers. Our particular wage setting rule assumes the
subsidy for each worker per e±ciency unit is the same across agents in the ¯rm.
An alternative is to assume that a ¯rm adjusts the wage conditional on the purchase decision of group insurance
by each agent or on some states. We made our choice in light of realism.
10adjusted wage is given as
wE = w ¡ cE; (4)







k=1 zk¹ pZ;E(kjiE = 1)
; (5)
where ¹ins
E is the fraction of workers that purchase health insurance, conditional on being o®ered
such bene¯ts, i.e. iE = 1. ¹ pZ;E(kjiE = 1) is the stationary probability of drawing productivity
zk conditional on iE = 1.21
3.6 The government
We impose government budget balance period by period. Social security and Medicare systems
are self-¯nanced by proportional taxes ¿ss and ¿med on labor income.
There is a \safety net" provided by the government, which we call social insurance. The
government guarantees a minimum level of consumption ¹ c for every agent by supplementing the
income in case the agent's disposable assets fall below ¹ c, as in Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes
(1995). The social insurance program stands in for social assistance and welfare programs such
as Medicaid and Food Stamp Program.
The government levies tax on income and consumption to ¯nance expenditures G and the
social insurance program. Labor and capital income are taxed according to a progressive tax
function T(¢) and consumption is taxed at a proportional rate ¿c.
3.7 Households
The state for a young agent is summarized by a vector sy = (a;z;x;iHI;iE), where a denotes
assets brought into the period, z the idiosyncratic shock to productivity, x the idiosyncratic
health expenditure shock from the last period that has to be paid in the current period, and
iHI an indicator function that takes a value 1 if the agent purchased health insurance in the
last period and 0 otherwise. The indicator function iE signals the availability of employer-based
health insurance bene¯ts in the current period.
The timing of events is as follows. A young agent observes the state (a;z;x;iHI;iE) at the
beginning of the period, then pays last period's health care bill x, makes the consumption and
savings decision, pays taxes and receives transfers and also decides on whether to be covered by
health insurance. After the agent has made all decisions, this period's health expenditure shock
x0 and next period's generation, i.e. whether he retires or not, and productivity and o®er status
21It is easy to verify that this wage setting rule satis¯es the zero pro¯t condition of a ¯rm that employs labor
N: wN = (total salary) + (total insurance costs paid by the ¯rm). Equilibrium conditions are satis¯ed in that
both types of ¯rms are indi®erent between o®ering and not o®ering group health insurance to employees.
11i0
E are revealed. Together with allocational decisions a0 and i0




E): The agent makes the health insurance decision i0
HI after he or she ¯nds
out whether the employer o®ers group insurance but before the health expenditure shock for the
current period x0 is known. Also notice that agents pay an insurance premium one period before
the expenditure payment occurs. Therefore the insurance company also earns interest on the
premium revenues accrued during one period.
Since the arrangements for the health expenditure payment di®er between young workers
and retirees and agents pay their health care bills with a one-period lag, we have to distinguish
between recently retired agents and the rest of the old agents. The former, which we call a
`recently retired agent', has to pay the health care bill of his last year, potentially covered by an
insurance contract he purchased as a young agent, while an existing old person, which we call
simply an `old agent', is covered by Medicare. As a result, the state for recently retired agents
is given as sr = (a;x;iHI) and for the other old agents so = (a;x):
We write the maximization problem of all three generations of agents (young, recently retired
and old) in a recursive form. In the value functions Vj, the subscript j denotes the generation of
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(1 ¡ 0:5(¿med + ¿ss))w if iE = 0






p ¢ (1 ¡ Ã) if i0
HI = 1 and iE = 1
pm(x) if i0




Tax = T(y) + 0:5(¿med + ¿ss)( ~ wz ¡ iE ¢ ~ p) (10)
y = maxf ~ wz + r(a + TB) ¡ iE ¢ ~ p;0g (11)
TSI = maxf0;(1 + ¿c)¹ c + (1 ¡ iHI ¢ q (x))x + T(~ y) ¡ ~ wz ¡ (1 + r)(a + TB)g (12)
~ y = ~ wz + r(a + TB)
12Young agents' choice variables are (c;a0;i0
HI), where c is consumption, a0 is the riskless savings
and i0
HI is the indicator variable for this period's health insurance which covers expenditures that
show up in next period's budget constraint. Remember that the current state x is last period's
expenditure shock while the current period's expenditure x0 is not known when the agents makes
the insurance coverage decision. Agents retire with probability ½o, in which case the agent's value
function will be that of a recently retired old, Vr(s0
o) = Vr(a0;x0;i0
HI), as de¯ned below.
Equation (7) is the °ow budget constraint of a young agent. Consumption, saving, medical
expenditures and payment for the insurance contract must be ¯nanced by labor income, saving
from previous period and a lump sum bequest transfer plus accrued interest (1 + r)(a + TB),
net of income and payroll taxes Tax plus social insurance transfer TSI if applicable. a0 cannot
exceed the borrowing limit a. ~ w is the wage per e±ciency unit already adjusted by the employer's
portion of payroll taxes and bene¯ts cost as speci¯ed in equation (8). If the agent's employer
does not o®er health insurance bene¯ts, it equals (1 ¡ 0:5(¿med + ¿ss))w; that is, the marginal
product of labor net of employer payroll taxes. If the employer does o®er insurance, the wage is
reduced by both cE, which is the health insurance cost paid by a ¯rm as de¯ned in equations (4)
and (5), and the payroll tax. Consequently, one could interpret the ~ wz as the gross salary.
Payroll taxes are imposed on the wage income net of paid insurance premium if it is provided
through an employer, as shown in the RHS of equation (10).22 Equation (11) represents the
income tax base; labor income paid to a worker plus accrued interest on savings and bequests
less the insurance premium, again provided that the purchase is through the employer. The
taxes are bounded below by zero.
The term TSI in equation (12) is a government transfer that guarantees a minimum level ¹ c
of consumption for each agent after receiving income, paying taxes and health care costs. The
health insurance premium for a new contract is not covered under the government's transfer
program.
The marginal cost of the insurance premium ~ p depends on the state iE as given in equa-
tion (9).23
22To be precise, the payroll tax base at each of ¯rm and individual levels is bounded below by zero, and we
have
Tax = T(y) + 0:5(¿med + ¿ss) ¢ maxf ~ wz ¡ iE ¢ ~ p;0g:
For simplicity we present it as in equation (10), which is applicable when the zero boundary condition does not
bind. The zero lower bound condition also applies for the employer portion of payroll taxes.
23Agents who are o®ered insurance by employers also have access to the individual insurance market and can
purchase a contract at the market price, which depends on the individual health status. Given the same coverage
ratios o®ered by each contract, agents choose to be insured at the lowest cost taking into account the tax break
which can be applied only when they choose to purchase an employer-based contract. In our benchmark model,
however, no one chooses to buy an individual contract in such a case since the fraction Ã paid by employers makes
an employer-based contract more attractive. This holds even for agents with the best health condition, who could
buy a contract in the market at the lowest price. Hence we write the premium as ~ p = p(1¡Ã), when iE = 1 and
i0
HI = 1.
13Recently retired agents' problem
Vr (sr) = max




(1 + ¿c)c + a
0 + (1 ¡ iHI ¢ q (x))x = ss ¡ pmed + (1 + r)(a + TB) ¡ T(y) + TSI (14)
y = r(a + TB) (15)
TSI = maxf0;(1 + ¿c)¹ c + (1 ¡ iHI ¢ q (x))x




Vo (so) = max




(1 + ¿c)c + a
0 + (1 ¡ qmed (x))x = ss ¡ pmed + (1 + r)(a + TB) ¡ T(y) + TSI (18)
y = r(a + TB) (19)
TSI = maxf0;(1 + ¿c)¹ c + (1 ¡ qmed (x))x
+pmed ¡ ss ¡ (1 + r)(a + TB) + T(y)g (20)
a
0 ¸ a
The choice variables of the two old generations are c;a0. The social security bene¯t payment
is denoted by ss and pmed is the Medicare premium that each old agent pays. The only di®erence
between the budget constraints of the two old generations is how health expenditures x are
¯nanced. The old agents are covered by Medicare for a fraction qmed(x) of x and the recently
retired agents are covered for q(x) if they purchased an insurance contract in the previous period.
3.8 Stationary competitive equilibrium
At the beginning of the period, each young agent is characterized by a state vector sy =
(a;z;x;iHI;iE), i.e. asset holdings a, labor productivity z, health care expenditure x, and indi-
cator functions for insurance holding iHI, and employer-based insurance bene¯ts iE. Old agent
has the state vector sr = (a;x;iHI) or so = (a;x); depending on whether the agent is recently
retired or not. Let a 2 A = R+, z 2 Z, x 2 X, iHI;iE 2 I = f0;1g and j 2 J = fy;r;og and
denote by S = fJg£fSy;Sr;Sog the entire state space of the agents, where Sy = A£Z£Xy £I2,
14Sr = A £ Xo £ I and So = A £ Xo. Let s 2 S denote a general state vector of an agent: s 2 Sy if
young, s 2 Sr if recently retired and s 2 So if old.
The equilibrium is given by interest rate r, wage rate w and adjusted wage wE; allocation
functions fc;a0;i0
HIg for young and fc;a0g for old; government tax system given by income tax
function T(¢), consumption tax ¿c, Medicare, social security and social insurance program; acci-
dental bequests transfer TB; the individual health insurance contracts given as pairs of premium
and coverage ratios fp;qg, fpm(x);qg; a set of value functions fVy(sy)gsy2Sy;fVr(sr)gsr2Sr and
fVo(so)gso2So; and distribution of households over the state space S given by ¹(s),
such that
1. Given the interest rate, the wage, the government tax system, Medicare, social security
and social insurance program, and the individual health insurance contract, the allocations
solve the maximization problem of each agent.
2. The interest rate r and wage rate w satisfy marginal productivity conditions, i.e. r =
FK(K;L) ¡ ± and w = FL(K;L), where K and L are total capital and labor employed in
the ¯rm's sector.
3. A ¯rm that o®ers employer-health insurance bene¯ts pays the wage net of cost, given as
wE = w ¡cE, where cE is the cost of health insurance premium per e±ciency unit paid by
a ¯rm, as de¯ned in equation (5).
4. The accidental bequests transfer matches the remaining assets (net of health care expen-












¹(sjj = r;o)ds (21)
5. The health insurance company is competitive, and satis¯es conditions (1) and (2).





[¿cc(s) + T(y(s))]¹(s)ds (22)
where y(s) is the taxable income for an agent with a state vector s.
7. Social security system is self-¯nancing.
ss
Z
¹(sjj = r;o)ds = ¿ss
Z
(~ wz ¡ 0:5i
0
HI ¢ iE ¢ p(1 ¡ Ã))¹(sjj = y)ds (23)
158. Medicare program is self-¯nancing.
Z
qmed (x)x¹(sjj = o)ds = ¿med
Z
( ~ wz ¡ 0:5i
0
HI ¢ iE ¢ p(1 ¡ Ã))¹(sjj = y)ds
+pmed
Z
¹(sjj = r;o)ds (24)
9. Capital and labor markets clear.
K =
Z




HI (iEp + (1 ¡ iE)pm (x))¹(sjj = y)ds (25)
L =
Z
z¹(sjj = y)ds (26)
10. The aggregate resource constraint of the economy is satis¯ed.








11. The law of motion for the distribution of agents over the state space S satis¯es
¹t+1 = R¹(¹t); (30)
where R¹ is a one-period transition operator on the distribution.
4 Calibration
In this section, we outline the calibration of the model. Table 1 summarizes the values and
describes the parameters.
A model period corresponds to one year.
4.1 Endowment, health insurance and health expenditures
Data source: For a detailed description of the calibration process, please refer to Appendix A.
For endowment, health expenditure shocks and health insurance, we use income and health data
from one source, the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), which is based on a series of
national surveys conducted by the U.S. Agency for Health Care Research and Quality (AHRQ).
16The MEPS consists of eight two-year panels from 1996/1997 up to 2003/2004 and includes data
on demographics, income and most importantly health expenditures and insurance. We drop the
¯rst three panels because one crucial variable that we need in determining the joint endowment
and insurance o®er process is missing in those panels.
To calibrate an income process, we consider wage income of all heads of households (both
male and female), unlike many existing studies in the literature on stochastic income process (for
example, Storesletten, et al, 2004, who use households to study earnings process, and Heathcote,
et al, 2004, who use white male heads of households to estimate wage process). We choose heads
instead of all individuals since many non-head individuals are covered by their spouses' health
insurance. Our model also captures those with zero or very low level of assets, who would be
eligible for public welfare assistance. Many households that fall in this category are headed by
females, which is why we include both males and females. Most of the existing studies on the
income process are focused on samples with strictly positive income, often above some threshold
level and such treatment does not ¯t in our model, either. Moreover, we want to capture the
heterogeneity in health insurance opportunities (group and individual) across the dimension of
the income states, which is possible only by using a comprehensive database like MEPS.
Endowment: We calibrate the endowment process jointly with the stochastic probability of
being o®ered employer-based health insurance. We specify the income distribution over the ¯ve
income states so that in each year, an equal number of agents belong to each of the ¯ve bins
of equal size. Then we determine for each individual in which bin he or she resides in the two
consecutive years and thus construct the joint transition probabilities pZ;E(z;iE;z0;i0
E) of going
from income bin z with insurance status iE to income bin z0 with i0
E. Recall iE is an indicator
function that takes a value 1 if employer-based health insurance is o®ered and 0 otherwise.
The joint Markov process is de¯ned over Nz £ 2 states with a transition matrix ¦Z;E of size
(Nz £2)£(Nz £2). We average the transition probabilities over the ¯ve panels weighted by the
number of people in each panel. We display the transition matrix in Appendix A.
Finally, in order to get the grids for z, we compute the average income in each of the ¯ve bins
in 2003 dollars. First we compute average income in 2003 dollars as $32,768. The z relative to
average income are
Z = f0:095;0:484;0:815;1:238;2:374g
Notice that the income shocks look quite di®erent from the ones normally used in the literature in
that we include all heads of households, even those with zero income. This generates an extremely
low income shock of about $3,000 for a sizeable measure of the population. We assume that the
agents cannot borrow, i.e. a = 0. Given that the lowest possible income is quite small, the
constraint is not very di®erent from imposing a natural borrowing limit.
The stationary distribution over the (Nz £ 2) grids is given as
17z grid number 1 2 3 4 5 sum
GHI o®ered (%) 3.1 11.3 14.9 16.4 16.9 62.6
GHI not o®ered (%) 17.1 8.6 5.0 3.6 3.1 37.4
There is an asymmetry in the income distribution for the agents with a group insurance o®er
and those without such an o®er. A high income is more likely to be associated with the group
insurance o®er.
Health expenditure shocks: In the same way as for the endowment process, we estimate
the process of health expenditure shocks and the transition probabilities directly from the MEPS
data. We use seven states for the expenditures and for each of the young and the old generations,
we specify the bins of size (20% £ 4;15%;4%;1%). Young agents' expenditure grids are given as
Xy = f> 0:000;0:005;0:018;0:047;0:135;0:397;1:436g
which are the mean expenditures in the seven bins in the ¯rst year of the last panel, that is, in
the year 2002. The transition matrices for each young generation are displayed in Appendix A.
The expenditures are normalized in terms of their ratios to the average labor income in 2003.
This parametrization generates average expenditures of 6:6% of mean labor income in the young
generation or $2,195 in year 2003 dollars.
Notice that an advantage of our procedure is that we can specify the bins ourselves. Average
expenditures in the ¯rst and second bins are less than 1% of average labor income. In contrast,
expenditures are substantial in the top bins. For example, the top 1% of the third generation have
average expenditures of about 1.5 times the average income (over $48,000 in 2003 dollars). The
next 4% have average expenditures of 40% of average income (over $13,000) while the following
15% spend about 14% of average income (about $4,600).
Likewise, using the same strategy for the old generation (common for j = r and o) we obtain
the expenditure grids
Xo = f0:005;0:033;0:077;0:156;0:397;0:988;2:209g
and the transition matrix displayed in Appendix A, which generates unconditional expectation
of xo of 18:1% of mean income or $5,936 in year 2003 dollars.
In our baseline calibration, we assume the health expenditure shocks are independent of other
states, in particular, the labor income z. We discuss the issue and the e®ects of incorporating
the correlation on our experiment results in section 6.
184.2 Health insurance
The coverage ratios of health insurance contracts are calibrated using the same ¯ve MEPS panels.
Given that the coverage depends on and increases in the health expenditures incurred by the
insured, we estimate a polynomial q(x), the coverage ratio as a function of expenditures x. More
details on the estimation of this function are given in Appendix A.4.
As mentioned before, there is a proportional operational cost incurred by insurance com-
panies, which is passed through to the insurance premiums as a mark-up. Our choice for the
mark-up is 11% based on the study in Kahn et al. (2005) and we assume that the same cost
is added to the group and individual insurance contracts, i.e. ÁG = ÁI. 24 Notice that this
parameter does not correspond to the total administrative cost in the health care sector, which
is sometimes estimated to be as high as one third. For example, Woolhandler et al. (2003)
estimate that in 1999, 31% of health expenditures were spent on administration, but most of
these expenditures are on the provider side which are part of our calibrated cost of health care
from MEPS already.
The group insurance premium p is determined in equilibrium to ensure zero pro¯ts for the
insurance company in the group insurance market. The average annual premium of an employer-
based health insurance was $2,051 in 1997 or about 7% of annual average labor income (Sommers,
2002). Model simulations yields a premium of 6:2% of average annual labor income.
A ¯rm o®ering employer-based health insurance pays a fraction Ã of the premium. According
to the MEPS, the average percentage of total premium paid by employees varies between 11%
and 23% depending on the industry in 1997 (Sommers, 2002). Estimates in other studies lie in
a similar range and we set the fraction (1 ¡ Ã) to 20%.25
With regards to individual health insurance, the insurance company sets pm (x) to satisfy the
equation (2), that is, pm (x) = (1 + ÁI)E fq (x0)x0jxg=(1 + r). The expectation is with respect
to the next period's expenditures x0, and we compute the premium using the transition matrix
¦xy as a function of last period's expenditures x. In the benchmark model, the premiums in the
unit of average labor income are given as follows.
bin 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
pm (x) 0.0156 0.0245 0.0488 0.0860 0.1221 0.2358 0.4905
4.3 Demographics, preferences and technology
We de¯ne the generations as follows. Young agents are between the ages of 20 and 64, and old
agents are 65 and over. Young agents' probability of aging ½o is set at 1=45 so that they stay for
24The ¯gure quoted in Kahn et al. (2005) is 9:9%, but this is overhead divided by the total premium, i.e., in
the context of our paper where the Á are overhead relative to expenditures only, we solve ÁI=(1 + ÁI) = 0:099
and ¯nd ÁI = 0:11.
2515.1% by National Employer Health Insurance Survey of the National Center for Health Statistics in 1993
and 16% by Employer Health Bene¯ts Survey of the Kaiser Family Foundation in 1999.
19an average of 45 years in the labor force before retirement. The death probability ½d is calibrated
so that the old agents above age 65 constitute 20% of the population, based on the panel data
set we discuss below. This is a slight deviation from the fraction of 17.4% in the Census because
our model unit is a head of a household. We abstract from the population growth and the
demographic structure remains the same across periods. Every period a measure
½d½o
½d+½o of young
agents enter the economy to replace the deceased old agents.
We calibrate the annual discount factor ¯ to achieve an aggregate capital output ratio K=Y =
3:0. We choose a risk aversion parameter of ¾ = 3 and conduct sensitivity analysis over the value
of ¾ in section 6.
Total factor productivity A is normalized so that the average labor income equals one in the
benchmark. The capital share ® is set at 0:33 and the depreciation rate ± at 0.06.
4.4 Government
Expenditures and taxation: The value for G, that is, the part of government spending
not dedicated to social insurance transfers, is exogenously given and it is ¯xed across all policy
experiments. We calibrate it to 18% of GDP in the benchmark economy in order to match the
share of government consumption and gross investment excluding transfers, at the federal, state
and local levels (The Economic Report of the President, 2004). We set the consumption tax rate
¿c at 5.67%, based on Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994).26
The income tax function consists of two parts, a non-linear progressive income tax and pro-
portional income tax. The progressive part mimics the actual income tax schedule in the U.S.
following the functional form studied by Gouveia and Strauss (1994), while the proportional part
stands in for all other taxes, that is, non-income and non-consumption taxes, which for simplicity








Parameter a0 is the limit of marginal taxes in the progressive part as income goes to in¯nity,
a1 determines the curvature of marginal taxes and a2 is a scaling parameter. To preserve the
shape of the tax function estimated by Gouveia and Strauss, we use their parameter estimates
fa0;a1g = f0:258;0:768g and choose the scaling parameter a2 such that the share of government
expenditures raised by the progressive part of the tax function a0
©
y ¡ (y¡a1 + a2)¡1=a1ª
equals
65%. This matches the fraction of total revenues ¯nanced by income tax (OECD Revenue Statis-
tics). The parameter a2 is calibrated within the model because it depends on other endogenous
26The consumption tax rate is the average over the years 1965-1996. The original paper contains data for
the period 1965-1988 and we use an unpublished extension for 1989-1996 for recent data available on Mendoza's
webpage.
20variables. The parameter ¿y in the proportional term is chosen to balance the overall government
budget and determined in the model's equilibrium.
Social insurance program: The minimum consumption °oor ¹ c is calibrated so that the model
achieves the target share of households with a low level of assets. Households with net worth of
less than $5,000 constitute 20.0% (taken from Kennickell, 2003, averaged over 1989-2001 SCF
data) and we use this fraction as a target to match in the benchmark equilibrium.
Social security system: We set the replacement ratio at 45% based on the study by White-
house (2003). In equilibrium, the total bene¯t payment equals the total social security tax
revenues. The social security tax rate is pinned down in the model given that the system is self-
¯nanced. We obtain the social security tax rate ¿ss = 10:61%, which (endogenously) matches
the current Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) part of the social security tax rate, 10:6%.
Medicare: We assume every old agent is enrolled in Medicare Part A and Part B. We use the
MEPS data to calculate the coverage ratio of Medicare in the ¯ve expenditure bins xo 2 Xo:
bin 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
qmed (x) 0.228 0.285 0.342 0.406 0.511 0.637 0.768
The Medicare premium for Part B was $799.20 annually in the year 2004 or about 2.11% of
annual GDP ($37,800 per person in 2004) which is the ratio that we use in the simulations.
The Medicare tax rate ¿med is determined within the model so that the Medicare system is
self-¯nanced. The model generates expenditures and revenues equal to 1.51% of labor income.27
5 Numerical results
5.1 Benchmark model
Although we don't calibrate the model to directly target and generate the patterns of health
insurance across the dimension of individual states, our model succeeds in matching them fairly
well not only qualitatively but in most cases even quantitatively. We measure the model's success
by comparing the take-up ratio, de¯ned as the share of households holding health insurance, in
the model versus data. The overall take-up ratio is 75.6% (73.1% in the data) among all young
agents and 35.5% among those not o®ered group health insurance (34.8% in the data).
27This ¯gure is lower than in reality (Medicare tax rate 2.9% with its expenditures of about 2.3% of GDP) for
two reasons. First, in our model Medicare is reserved exclusively for the old generation while the actual Medicare
system pays for certain expenditures even for young agents. Second, payroll taxes apply to all of labor income
while in reality there is a threshold level ($97,500 as of 2007) above which the marginal payroll tax is zero.
21Figure 1 displays the take-up ratios of the model over the labor income together with the
same statistics from the MEPS data.28 Both in the data and model, the take-up ratios increase
in income. If agents are o®ered group insurance, the take-up ratios are very high since they
receive the subsidy from the ¯rm and the tax bene¯t. As we saw in the calibration section,
agents with higher income are more likely to be o®ered group insurance and very few agents in
the lowest income grid receive such a bene¯t, which contributes to the lower take-up ratio of
low-income agents. Also recall that we do not impose any income threshold and capture agents
with zero or very low labor income and. Many of them have a very low level of assets and are
likely to be eligible for the social insurance. In case the agents face a high expenditure shock and
can only purchase individual health insurance at a high premium, they may choose to remain
uninsured in the hope of receiving the social insurance and having the health cost be covered by
the government.
Figure 2 displays the take-up ratios over the health expenditures. The data show a fairly °at
take-up ratio between 70 and 80% except for the agents with very low expenditures. Our model
also generates a °at pattern of take-up ratios, although we are a bit o® at the very low end,
where the data exhibit a drop in the coverage. One possible reason is our assumption that all the
employers pay 80% of the premium at the ¯rm level, which is based on the average subsidy ratio
in the data. In practice, however, di®erent ¯rms cover a varying fraction of the premium and the
data may capture some of those agents with a less generous employer subsidy. The healthiest
agents with a relatively low expected expenditure may choose not to be insured if the employer
subsidy is su±ciently low.
Figures 3 and 4 plot take-up ratios over income and expenditures for those agents o®ered
GHI. The model overstates the health insurance demand somewhat, especially at the low end of
the income and expenditure distributions. It is likely that in the data individuals with relatively
low income, say in income bin 1, could work for employers with a less generous subsidy than the
average Ã = 0:80. As mentioned before, heterogeneity across the employer subsidy may solve
this problem. We leave this to future and ongoing research. Most of the mass in the income
distribution, of course, is concentrated among the higher bins where the ¯t is much better.
Finally, Figures 5 and 6 plot take-up ratios for those not o®ered GHI. Both over income and
expenditure the model replicates the empirical take-up ratios fairly well, most of the time within
10 percentage points.
5.2 Policy experiments
We now conduct experiments to determine the e®ect of changes in the tax treatment of health
insurance. In the experiments, we treat changes in the government revenue as follows: expen-
28We estimate the empirical take-up ratios over income via a probit model on three regressors: a constant, log
of income and the squared log income. Likewise for the plots over expenditures (see below) we use the log of
expenditures and squared log expenditures.
22ditures G; consumption tax rate ¿c and the progressive part of the income tax function remain
unchanged from the benchmark. We adjust the proportional tax rate ¿y to balance the govern-
ment budget. Medicare and social security systems remain self-¯nanced and the revenue will also
be a®ected because the labor income, which is the payroll tax base, changes across experiments.
We keep the Medicare premium pmed at the benchmark level and adjust the tax rate ¿med to
maintain the balance. For the social security system, we keep the replacement ratio at 45% and
adjust the retirement bene¯t ss to account for the changes in the average labor income and the
tax rate ¿ss to balance the program's budget.
In each experiment, we ¯rst compute a steady state outcome under the stationary equilibrium
and then the transition dynamics. In the latter, we assume that in period 0, the economy is in
the steady state of the benchmark economy. In period 1, an unanticipated change of the policy
is announced and implemented and the economy starts to make a transition to the new steady
state. Throughout the transition, the proportional tax rate ¿y as well as payroll taxes ¿ss and ¿med
are adjusted to balance the overall budget of the government, social security and the Medicare
systems respectively. The group health insurance premium also changes as the insurance demand
evolves over time.
In order to assess the welfare e®ect of a reform, once we solve for the transition dynamics, we
compute the consumption equivalent variation (\CEV"). It measures a constant increment in
percentage of consumption in every state of the world that has to be given to the agent so that
he is indi®erent between remaining in the benchmark and moving to another economy which is
about to make a transition to the new steady state implied by an alternative policy.
5.2.1 Abolishing tax deductibility of group premium costs
In order to understand the economic and welfare e®ects of the current tax policy about health
insurance, we ask what the agents would do if there was no such policy. The experiment (ex-
periment A) invokes a radical change - the government abolishes the entire deductibility of the
group insurance premium for both income and payroll tax purposes. Taxes are now collected on
the entire portion of the premium and the taxable income is given as
y = ~ wz + r(a + TB) + iEi
0
HIÃp:
Note that not only is the employee-paid portion no longer tax-deductible, but also the portion
paid by the employer is subject to taxation and considered as part of the taxable income of an
individual.
We allow supply side e®ects as a result of policy changes, both on the extensive and in-
tensive margin, i.e. the probability of GHI o®ers and generosity in terms of the subsidy rate.
On the intensive margin we assume that the employer subsidy to GHI adjusts when the pre-
23mium changes. Speci¯cally, we assume that employers pay Ãm for every dollar of premium
above the benchmark value of pbench: In other words, employers pay a total subsidy worth
Ãp = Ãbenchpbench + Ãm ¡
p ¡ pbench¢
: This speci¯cation is motivated by the observation that at
the margin employers tend to carry a much smaller share of the GHI premium, i.e., Ãm < Ãbench.
This fact has been documented in the literature. For example, Gruber and McKnight (2003),
argue that \the key dimension along which employers appear to be adjusting their health insur-
ance spending is through the generosity of what they contribute." Sommers (2005) argues that
wage stickiness prevents ¯rms from reducing wages when the premium increases. Simon (2005)
estimates that the employers pass 75% of the premium hike as increased employee contributions
(i.e. only 25% paid by employers), but we regard this estimate of employer contribution is too low
given that he looked at small ¯rms only who tend to be less generous with their group insurance
subsidy as pointed out by Gruber and Lettau (2004). Hence we set Ãm at 50%.
For the extensive margin, to gauge the e®ect on the o®er probability we rely on work by
Gruber and Lettau (2004) who run a probit model of GHI o®ers on the tax-price of health
insurance, which is de¯ned as the after tax price of one dollar worth of insurance. They estimate
that taking away the income and payroll tax subsidy, thereby increasing the tax-price of health
insurance to unity, is going to reduce the share of workers that are o®ered GHI by 15:5%. To
account for lower o®er rates, we adjust the transition matrix ¦Z;E. Speci¯cally, we target a new
stationary distribution psd such that
psd (x;iE = 1) = 0:845 ¤ p
bench
sd (x;iE = 1)
psd (x;iE = 0) = 0:155 ¤ p
bench
sd (x;iE = 1) + psd (x;iE = 0)
where pbench
sd is the stationary distribution from the benchmark.29 This yields the following
probabilities (in percentage) of being o®ered insurance
z grid number 1 2 3 4 5 sum
GHI o®ered: benchmark 3.2 11.2 15.1 16.4 17.3 62.6
GHI o®ered: no tax subsidy 2.7 9.5 12.8 13.8 14.6 52.9
Change -15.5% -15.5% -15.5% -15.5% -15.5% -15.5%
This ensures that the total share of agents o®ered group insurance is 15:5% lower than in the
benchmark, but the distribution of labor productivity is unchanged. We conduct sensitivity
analysis of our results under alternative assumptions about the supply side reactions. Speci¯cally,
we check how results change if we disregard the supply side e®ect on the intensive or extensive
margins, or both. See section 6 for details.
Experiment results are summarized in Table 2. The top section displays some statistics on
29Appendix A.5 has more details on how we construct the new ¦Z;E matrix.
24health insurance: the premium of group insurance p, the overall take-up ratio TURall, the take-
up ratio conditional on not being o®ered group insurance TURnoG and o®ered group insurance
TURG. The next two rows Group and Individual show the break-down of TURG, i.e. the
fraction of agents who bought group insurance (Group) or individual insurance (Individual)
conditional on being o®ered group insurance. The second section displays aggregate variables
including the proportional tax rate ¿y on income that balances the government budget and the
third section shows the welfare e®ects of each reform. % w/ CEV > 0 indicates the fraction
of young agents in the benchmark that would experience a welfare gain (positive CEV) if the
alternative policy is implemented.
Removing the tax subsidy leads to a partial collapse of the group insurance market. The
take-up ratio conditional on being o®ered group insurance falls from 99.0% in the benchmark to
57.4%. About two-thirds of those who remain insured opt out of the group insurance market and
purchase a contract in the individual market. Those are the agents in a better health condition
who face a lower premium in the individual insurance market. The exit of these agents out of the
group insurance market signi¯cantly deteriorates the health quality in the pool of the insured
and the price of the group insurance premium p jumps up to $5,316 from the benchmark price
of $2,018. The overall coverage ratio falls by as much as 27.3%. An increased exposure to the
health expenditure shocks raises the precautionary savings demand and the aggregate capital
increases by 0.8%. The magnitude of the drop is relatively small given the size of the decrease
in the coverage, since many agents who become uninsured by declining the group insurance o®er
are healthy and less concerned about expenditure shocks in the immediate future. The ¯rm's
cost of providing the bene¯t is lower despite the price increase, since much fewer workers take
the o®er.
Although the wage rate is higher and the proportional tax rate ¿y and the social security
tax rate ¿ss are lower than in the benchmark due to the increased tax base, it is not enough
to compensate for the welfare loss due to the lower insurance coverage and increased exposure
to health expenditure shocks. Agents without the o®er will also face a welfare loss since the
group insurance o®er they may receive in future is not so attractive any more and they are
exposed to more expenditure risks ask well. As shown in % w/ CEV > 0, only 20% of agents
would experience a welfare gain from such a reform, and the average welfare e®ect (in CEV ) is
negative, in the order of 0.34% in terms of consumption in every state.
5.2.2 Other experiments
Experiment B. ¯xing regressiveness: In this experiment, we let the government continue
to provide a subsidy for the group insurance, but correct for regressiveness associated with the
deduction from the progressive income tax system. More precisely, the government abolishes the
premium deductibility for the income tax purpose and in exchange returns a lump-sum subsidy
25for the purchase of group insurance. The subsidy is determined so that the government maintains
the budget balance while keeping the income tax rate ¿y unchanged.
Compared to the benchmark, this policy is intended to be more bene¯cial if the agent with
a group insurance o®er belongs to a lower income group, because under the benchmark the
deduction was based on their lower marginal tax rate. The subsidy based on the average tax rate
under this policy is common across agents and higher than the bene¯t deduction from the lower
tax bracket. As shown in the Table 3, the coverage goes up by most among the lowest income
people and the welfare is improved, although the magnitude is relatively small.
Experiment C. extending tax deductibility to the non-group insurance market: In
the next policy experiment, the government keeps the current tax deductibility for the group
insurance premium untouched and aims to correct for the horizontal equity by providing some
bene¯t for the individual insurance market. One way to do it is to extend the same tax advantage
to everyone, i.e. agents who purchase a contract in the individual market can also deduct the
premium cost from their income and payroll tax bases. As shown in the top section of Table 3,
the policy would increase the insurance coverage among the people without an access to the
group insurance market by more than 38% and the overall coverage by 14%. An increased cost
of providing deduction is re°ected in the higher proportional tax rate ¿y and social security tax
rate ¿ss. The higher coverage across the di®erent health status reduces the precautionary savings
and the aggregate capital falls by about 0.7%.
In terms of welfare, the policy brings a relatively large welfare gain for those without an
insurance o®er from the employer, 0.38% in terms of the consumption equivalence. Despite the
decrease in the aggregate consumption in the ¯nal steady state, the reform will enable agents to
smooth consumption across the states and enhances the overall welfare. The number of agents
who are eligible for the social insurance goes down by 1.5%, since agents are better insured and
less exposed to a catastrophic health shock that would bring their disposable assets down to hit
the minimum consumption level ¹ c.
Experiment D. providing credit to the non-group insurance market: In experiments
D-1 and D-2, the government o®ers a refundable credit of $1,000 to supplement for the purchase
of individual insurance, if the person is not o®ered group insurance. In D-2, the provision of the
subsidy is subject to the income threshold of $30,000, above which the subsidy phases out. As
shown in Table 3, there is a signi¯cant e®ect on the insurance coverage among those without an
access to group insurance. The conditional take-up ratio increases from 36% to 87% and 76% in
D-1 and D-2, respectively.
The comparison of the results in experiments D-1 and D-2 reveals the tradeo® between the
cost and e±ciency in targeting bene¯ciaries. By restricting the eligibility to the lower income
households in D-2, the required increase in the proportional tax rate ¿y is 0.42% as opposed to
260.65% in D-1. The policy increases the overall TUR by 15% and 19%. It becomes more costly
to provide an incentive to be insured if the agent's income is higher. Wealthy households with
more assets are better insured by their accumulated savings and the marginal price that makes
them indi®erent between buying a contract and not buying is higher.
At the bottom of Table 3, we display the take-up ratios across income shocks z and health
expenditure shocks x. In D-1, compared to C, there is much larger increase of the take-up
ratios among lower-income households. Providing a refundable credit as in D-1 and D-2 is more
e®ective than a tax deduction because low-income agents do not pay much tax. Therefore, they
receive only small bene¯ts from the deduction policy. The credit policy D-2 is also e®ective in
increasing the coverage among the poor, while the coverage among the rich changes little due
to the phase-out of the bene¯t at a high income level. As shown in the take-up ratios over the
expenditure shocks x, both credit policies encourage the purchase among healthier agents, since
they face a lower premium cost, the large part of which can be covered by the subsidy.
Increased risk-sharing together with the higher tax rate reduce the saving motive and the
aggregate capital and output are lower in both D-1 and D-2. Despite the increased tax burden
and the relatively large fall in the aggregate level of consumption, the gain from the better
insurance coverage and an increased protection against expenditure shocks dominate the negative
e®ects and the welfare e®ect among young agents is positive on average with a CEV of 0.58% and
0.55% in the two experiments. The number of agents eligible for the social insurance is about
3%. The vast majority of the agents would support such reform proposals.
6 Extensions and discussions of the model
Supply side response: In experiment A, where the tax policy is completely eliminated, we
allowed the ¯rms to react in both extensive and intensive margins based on empirical studies. In
this section, we present results under alternative assumptions about the supply side reactions.
Instead of using the exogenous assumptions about the GHI o®ers, one could model the demand
and supply decisions of workers and ¯rms jointly. Dey and Flinn (2005) build and estimate a
model using a search, matching and bargaining environment and study how employer-based
health insurance a®ects job mobility. There is a clear tradeo® between the richness of the model
and the tractability. The structural model of Dey and Flinn, for example, while richer in the
labor market frictions, assumes an exogenous health insurance premium and abstracts from a
market for individual health insurance or decisions about savings as an alternative insurance
device. Therefore it is not suitable for the policy analysis we have in mind, i.e. to understand
how the agents decide to choose a particular insurance over alternatives, when the relative price
is a®ected by a policy change. We choose to focus on the details on the demand side and abstract
from the supply side decisions. Our main results, however, that the current policy enhances the
27pooling of the group insurance and improves the welfare is found to be robust to the plausible
variations of the supply side reactions.
Table 4 summarizes the results. In the ¯rst experiment (i) no adj., we make an assumption
at one extreme that ¯rms do not respond at all to the policy change. They continue to pay
80% of the premium as a subsidy no matter how high the price is and the o®er probability is
not a®ected. In experiments (ii) ext. and (iii) int., ¯rms adjust only one margin (extensive or
intensive) at one time.
As shown in Table 4, the elimination of the policy always triggers a partial collapse of the
group health insurance market, making the healthy agents leave the pool. The adjustment
of the intensive margin is shown to reduce the conditional take-up ratios among those o®ered
group insurance more signi¯cantly, since the adjustment directly raises the marginal price of the
contract. The negative welfare e®ect of the policy change is robust across experiments under
alternative speci¯cations and it is sizeable even under an extreme assumption of no adjustment
at all.
Correlation between health expenditures and labor income: In the baseline model,
we imposed an assumption that health expenditure and income processes are independent. It
is conceivable, however, that poor health may negatively a®ect labor productivity. Looking at
the panel data we found that overall there is only a small negative correlation between the two
variables. Closer inspection, however, reveals that this small number disguises the fact that it
is mainly a small share of individuals with very high expenditures who have signi¯cantly lower
income. We found that the average income in expenditure bins x6 and x7 is lower than the
unconditional mean by 12 and 31 percent, respectively. In contrast, income in the ¯rst ¯ve bins
is marginally higher than the aggregate, by only 0:8 percent.
As a robustness check we introduce a negative correlation between expenditure and income
shocks by scaling up or down the labor income based on the current health expenditure shock.30
We recalibrate the model with the correlated process of income and expenditures and present the
results of the benchmark and the main experiment of eliminating the tax policy in Table 5. We
¯nd a stronger demand for health insurance than in the baseline model with no such correlation.
Health insurance has more value since it pays out more when agents face negative income shocks
associated with very high health expenditures. Implicitly, it provides insurance against income
shocks as well, although the price does not re°ect the value.
E®ects of the policy experiment are similar, qualitatively and quantitatively in most cases.
The loss of subsidy will trigger the partial collapse of the group insurance market as in the
baseline model, but the e®ect is less severe since more people choose to remain insured despite
30Speci¯cally, we assume that an agent with labor productivity shock i and health expenditure shock j has
zi ¢ »j e±ciency units of labor available, where the scaling »j is such that »j=1.0085 for j = 1;:::;5, »6=0.8773
and »7 = 0:6879. Notice that we choose the » such that their average (weighted by the stationary distribution of
expenditures) is one.
28the increase in the marginal price because of the additional value of the insurance contract.
Risk aversion: We assess the e®ects of the tax policy in a model with an alternative level of
risk aversion, namely with the relative risk aversion coe±cient ¾ of 2 and 4 as opposed to 3 in
the baseline calibration. As we show in Table 5, the demand for insurance increases with the
degree of risk aversion and the overall insurance coverage is 68%, 76% and 83%, when ¾ is set
at 2, 3 (benchmark) and 4, respectively. This is intuitive: with higher risk aversion agents are
more willing to stay in the insurance contract despite higher prices.
We also ¯nd that with ¾ = 4 the share of agents eligible for the social insurance coverage
decreases after eliminating the tax subsidy. We explain this with a large increase in precautionary
savings evident in the increase of more than 1 percent in the aggregate capital stock. Being more
self-insured, fewer agents are eligible for the social insurance coverage.
As shown in Table 5, the policy elimination will cause a signi¯cant welfare loss in a very
similar magnitude across the wide range of the risk aversion we consider. With a low risk
aversion, although the agents value the insurance less, the coverage declines more signi¯cantly
and they are exposed to much larger risk ex-post. With a high risk aversion, the relatively small
drop in the coverage causes large welfare e®ects in terms of welfare since they care more about
smoothing consumption.
Premium mark-up of group and individual insurance: We assumed that the same mark-
up is added to the insurance premium for both group and individual contracts. In this experi-
ment, we consider a case where there is a di®erence in the markup, in particular, administering
individual contracts incur more overhead costs and the mark-up is 50% above that of the group
insurance. We set the mark-ups at 13.2% and 8.8% for individual and group contracts so that it
is 11% on average.
The last columns in Table 5 show the results. In the benchmark, the coverage among the
agents who have no access to group insurance goes down, from 35.5% with the baseline calibration
to 28.3% with the higher mark-up. Eliminating the deduction will cause a collapse of the group
insurance market in a similar magnitude, although the demand for the individual insurance is
somewhat lower due to the higher marginal cost. The welfare e®ects are more negative since
many agents now only have the access to the individual contracts that are more expensive.
Exogenous health expenditures and moral hazard: We treat health expenditures as an
exogenous shock that follows a Markov process. A challenging, yet interesting extension of
our work would be to endogenize medical expenditures.31 In terms of the results of our main
31For example, one could model health expenditures that directly a®ects the utility or introduce an interaction
between the expenditures and mortalities. See for example Bajari, Hong, and Khwaja (2006) and Hall and Jones
(2007).
29experiment, adding endogenous health expenditures would have two major e®ects. Taking away
the tax deductibility will reduce over-investment in health, at least for those who drop out of
the group insurance market and do not sign up for an individual coverage. This ¯rst e®ect could
improve the social welfare given the better allocation of available resources.
Bajari, Hong, and Khwaja (2006) also show that moral hazard is concentrated among rel-
atively healthy individuals, i.e. their demand for medical services is more elastic to the price
change than unhealthy individuals.32 It implies that in response to eliminating the tax de-
ductibility on group insurance, healthy agents will respond more elastically, by opting out of
the group insurance contract faced with a higher marginal price and reduce the consumption of
medical services. Those left in the group insurance pool will face a more signi¯cant increase of
the premium than we saw in a model without moral hazard since the pool will lose a larger num-
ber of healthy agents. Therefore, the mechanism of the collapse of the group insurance market
that we emphasized will remain in place and we suspect that welfare cost of losing risk-sharing
opportunities more severely will be large, although the exact magnitude is unknown until we
build and simulate a model.
Self-selection into GHI jobs: We assume that agents take the GHI o®er as exogenously
given. Another major extension of our model would be to allow for the self-selection of individuals
into jobs that do or do not o®er group health insurance plans.
We conjecture that endogenizing the mobility decision in what sector (GHI or non-GHI) to
work in, will make our results even stronger. This is because of the response of healthy agents
in the GHI ¯rm to the removal of the tax subsidy. In our baseline economy, healthy individuals
continued to cross-subsidize the agents with high expenditures in their ¯rm, even after they
dropped out of the GHI contract: the wage of all workers in the GHI ¯rm, even those who don't
sign up, is scaled down to cover the employer share of the GHI premium. In an alternative model
with a sector choice, however, healthy agents who no longer want to sign up for GHI can escape
that disadvantageous cross-subsidization and simply work in the non-GHI sector that o®ers a
high wage. This would diminish pooling in the group contract even more than in our baseline,
exacerbating the welfare losses after the removal of the GHI tax subsidy. Of course, the extent of
such mobility is an empirical issue that must take into account the various labor market frictions,
which certainly goes beyond the scope of our paper, but if such an e®ect exists, the welfare losses
in our economy can be viewed as a lower bound.
32Speci¯cally, they show that the expenditures of healthy agents respond more strongly to insurance by mea-
suring the elasticity of medical expenditures with respect to the derivative of the co-payment function. The
coe±cient on the dummy variable for excellent health is much larger in absolute value than for that for fair
health. In plain words, households have a lot of discretion to skip the doctor's visit for the common cold, but for
the acute and very expensive medical conditions like heart attack and stroke, they will likely have no or limited
room to adjust the scope of the medical procedures. Two heart attack patients in the emergency room, one with
and one without health insurance, are likely to receive a treatment of a similar cost.
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We study the tax policy associated with employer-provided health insurance in a general equi-
librium model. Our main innovation is that we endogenize the health insurance decision and
generate adverse selection in the group health insurance market. The model captures various
institutions surrounding the di®erent types of health insurance in a parsimonious way, yet it is
rich enough to generate insurance demand that closely resembles that observed in the data. We
examine the e®ects of several tax reforms and in each case we compute the transition dynamics
from the benchmark economy to a new equilibrium under an alternative policy.
The experiments indicate that despite some issues entailed in the current tax system, pro-
viding some form of subsidy and an incentive for the group insurance coverage has a merit.
Employer-provided group insurance has the feature that everyone can purchase a contract at the
same premium irrespective of any individual characteristics - most importantly it is independent
of current health status. Relatively healthy agents would have an incentive to opt out of this
contract and either self-insure or ¯nd a cheaper insurance contract in the individual market. A
subsidy on group insurance can therefore encourage even healthy agents to sign up, maintain the
diverse health quality of the insurance pool and alleviate the adverse selection problem that could
plague the group insurance contract. We conduct an experiment that con¯rms this intuition by
showing that a complete removal of the subsidy would result in a deterioration of health quality
in the group insurance market, a rise in the group insurance premium, a signi¯cant reduction in
the insurance coverage, which put together reduces the welfare.
Our results are robust across a wide variety of alternative assumptions and parameterizations.
For example, di®erent assumptions about how the supply of group health insurance o®er responds
to the elimination of the tax subsidy all yield substantial welfare losses. Likewise, di®erent values
for the risk aversion parameter or the markups for group versus individual insurance yield results
very similar to the baseline economy.
Our work complements the existing studies on the health policy and insurance by highlighting
the additional insights one would only obtain by employing a general equilibrium framework.
Equilibrium prices and aggregate variables are a®ected by changes in policy. For example,
changing the tax treatment of the health insurance premium a®ects the composition of agents
that sign up and therefore the equilibrium insurance premium. Altering the attractiveness of
health insurance also a®ects precautionary demand for savings, which in turn a®ects the level
of consumption and factor prices. We have also shown that it is important to capture ¯scal
consequences of a reform because providing the subsidy will a®ect the magnitude of distortionary
taxation that must be levied on other sources. Moreover, the changes in insurance demand are
shown to a®ect other government sponsored welfare programs such as Medicaid.
We also ¯nd that there is room for signi¯cantly increasing the insurance coverage and improv-
ing welfare by restructuring the current subsidy system. Extending the bene¯t to the individual
31insurance market to restore horizontal equity is more e®ective if the subsidy is refundable. Ex-
tending the deductions to the individual insurance is less e®ective since low income households
will receive less bene¯t from such a reform. The refundable credit policy is shown to raise the
coverage by about 20% and enhance the welfare despite the increase in the ¯scal burden and the
lower level of aggregate output and consumption due to the lower precautionary saving motives.
Since our focus is on the e®ect of the tax policy, we chose not to alter other institutions and
features of the model along the transition. An interesting extension of the current paper will
be to ask how agents' insurance and saving decisions as well as the government's ¯scal balance
will be a®ected in response to the future changes in those environment, in particular, the rapidly
rising health costs and changing demographics. We also conjectured that other extensions, not
yet explicitly modeled, such as endogenous health expenditures or self-selection of individuals
into jobs with health insurance o®er, are unlikely to overturn our results. Also, a radical policy
reform would be the introduction of a national health system. We address these issues in future
and ongoing research.
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34Appendix
A Data and calibration details
We discuss additional details regarding the calibration of endowment, health insurance and
expenditure processes.
A.1 Selection of individuals
The MEPS database does not explicitly identify a head of household, but rather one reference
person per dwelling unit, usually the owner or renter. If more than one person owns/rents
the unit then the interviewer picks exactly one of them. Unfortunately, the de¯nition of one
household in the model as one dwelling unit in the data is inappropriate for our purposes. This
is because if multiple households live in one single dwelling unit we may miss a large fraction of
the population. This happens if roommates share a unit, in which case we want to capture each
person as a separate economic unit. Another example would be adult children living with their
parents, where we want to capture the parents and the child as separate economic units.
Our de¯nition of a household, therefore, is based on the Health Insurance Eligibility Unit
(HIEU) de¯ned in the MEPS database. A HIEU is a unit that includes adults and other family
members who are eligible for coverage under family insurance plans. Thus, each dwelling unit
is composed of potentially multiple HIEUs. A HIEU includes spouses, unmarried natural or
adoptive children of age 18 or under and children under 24 who are full-time students. The
de¯nition of a head is the single adult member in case of an unmarried couple. For a household
with a married couple, we choose the one with a higher income as the head of the households.
We tried other de¯nitions as head of households, for example the older adult, but the calibration
results did not change materially.
MEPS also provides the longitudinal weight for each individual which we use to compute all
of the statistics in our calibration, i.e., all moments are weighted by the MEPS weight. Finally,
we call agents aged 20-64 `young' and those age 65+ `old'.
Next, we stack individuals in the ¯ve di®erent panels into one large data set, of course
converting all nominal values into dollars of the base year 2003. Ho do we handle the longitudinal
weights? For each panel we rescale the weights such that sum of the weights in that panel is equal
to the number of heads of households age 20 and older. That way within each panel people get
a weight proportional to their longitudinal weights, and each panel gets a weight proportional to
the number of heads of household in the age groups we consider. The number of observations in
each panel is as follows.
Panel 1999/2000 2000/2001 2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004 Total
Individuals 6,099 4,839 9,863 7,381 7,612 35,794
A.2 Transition matrices
A.2.1 Income and health insurance o®er
MEPS records annual wage income, for example, variable WAGEPyyX stands for income in the
year yy2 f99;00;01;02;03;04g. We keep all individuals in the sample, regardless of income.
Speci¯cally, even those with zero income stay in our sample and account for almost 9 percent of
our samples. MEPS also records whether a person is o®ered health insurance at the workplace
35(variables OFFER31X, OFFER42X and OFFER53X). The three variables refer to three subpe-
riods each year in which interviews were conducted. We assume that an individual was o®ered
insurance if he or she got an o®er in at least one subperiod.
Constructing the transition matrix is then simply summing up the longitudinal weights of
individuals that jump from one of the Nz £ 2 bins in the ¯rst year into the Nz £ 2 bins in the
second year. We also compute stationary distributions as well as the average income in each of
the Nz bins to use it as the income grid point of our Markov process.
The transition matrix for the income z and group insurance o®er status iE is as follows.
Entries 1 to 5 from the top are the income bins 1 to 5 with employer-based insurance and entries
6 to 10 are the ¯ve income groups without insurance o®ered. For example, ¦Z;E(7;3) = 0:038
implies that given the agent has income z = 2 and no group insurance o®er this period, the
probability of having income z = 3 and a group insurance o®er in the next period is 3.8%,










0:201 0:312 0:110 0:065 0:046 0:165 0:074 0:019 0:005 0:002
0:068 0:439 0:252 0:079 0:018 0:051 0:065 0:022 0:008 0:002
0:024 0:122 0:489 0:240 0:052 0:015 0:019 0:024 0:013 0:002
0:012 0:060 0:152 0:527 0:187 0:011 0:008 0:010 0:022 0:011
0:009 0:025 0:048 0:134 0:724 0:009 0:004 0:008 0:008 0:030
0:042 0:045 0:013 0:007 0:003 0:715 0:124 0:033 0:013 0:005
0:025 0:119 0:038 0:022 0:004 0:219 0:373 0:136 0:040 0:025
0:010 0:044 0:098 0:035 0:014 0:140 0:202 0:286 0:126 0:046
0:008 0:018 0:034 0:075 0:029 0:099 0:137 0:158 0:306 0:136









A.2.2 Health Expenditure Shocks
MEPS reports total health expenditures as well as a breakdown into di®erent sources of payment.
Expenditures refer to the amount actually paid as opposed to the amount charged by providers.
See AHRQ (2003), p. C-101, for details. We disregard medical expenditures paid for by Veteran's
A®airs (TOTVAyy), Workman's Compensation (TOTWCPyy) and other sources (TOTOSRyy).
Summing up the remaining categories gives us the total medical expenditures considered in our
model.
As before, we assign expenditures in both years into their respective percentiles and sum up
the weights of agents that move from one of the Nx bins in the ¯rst year into the Nx bins in the
second year. The transition matrices for the health expenditures shocks xy for young and xo for







0:542 0:243 0:113 0:061 0:032 0:007 0:002
0:243 0:330 0:242 0:117 0:056 0:011 0:001
0:119 0:224 0:296 0:232 0:098 0:025 0:006
0:058 0:130 0:225 0:347 0:201 0:035 0:005
0:043 0:079 0:140 0:263 0:371 0:090 0:014
0:030 0:063 0:080 0:203 0:359 0:200 0:065












0:654 0:165 0:075 0:055 0:042 0:009 0:001
0:191 0:385 0:199 0:126 0:075 0:021 0:003
0:071 0:222 0:323 0:217 0:135 0:026 0:005
0:057 0:146 0:249 0:311 0:184 0:041 0:013
0:027 0:084 0:173 0:318 0:292 0:083 0:024
0:026 0:090 0:102 0:216 0:375 0:137 0:054







MEPS records whether an individual who o®ered group insurance through the workplace actually
signs up for it (variables HELD31X, HELD42X and HELD53X). As with the o®er variables we
assume that a person signed up he or she did so in at least one subperiod. We also have data on
whether an individual had any kind of private insurance (GHI or IHI) during the year (variable
PRVEVyy=1, where yy2 f99;00;01;02;03;04g). We assume those who were not o®ered GHI
but who hold private insurance, are in the IHI contract. If a person is o®ered GHI, did not
accept it, but still holds private insurance, we assume that he or she is covered by IHI.
A.4 Calibration of the health insurance coverage ratio q(x)
We compute the coverage ratios of private insurance for young agents and Medicare for old
agents. We use a polynomial of the following form:
q = ¯0 + ¯1 log(x) + ¯2(logx)
2;
where x is the total health expenditures in US dollars and q corresponds to the coverage ratio
of private health insurance for young agents and Medicare coverage ratio for old agents. We
consider only agents with positive expenditures in this regression. For the young generation we
also restrict our attention to those that actually have private insurance (variable PRVEVyy=1).
We use weighted least squares to ¯nd the following estimates, where the standard errors in


















We plug in the Nx grid points to attain the coverage ratio for each bin. We ¯nd the following
coverage ratios for each expenditure grid.
37bin 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
q (x) 0.341 0.532 0.594 0.645 0.702 0.765 0.845
qmed (x) 0.228 0.285 0.342 0.406 0.511 0.637 0.768
A.5 Constructing the ¦Z;E matrix to achieve lower GHI o®er rates
We construct a new ¦Z;E matrix such that there is a 15.5 percent lower chance of receiving a











where upper left block ¦11
Z;E is the income transition probabilities of agents who have a GHI o®er
in the current year and keep it, ¦10
Z;E is the income transition probabilities of agents who have
GHI but lose it, etc.
In the experiment with the supply side e®ect we assume that those agents who lose the GHI





















One can think of this as introducing an additional iE state for people without GHI who have the
income transition matrix as those with the GHI o®er. If we instead assume that agents who lost
their GHI are subject to the income transition matrix ¦00
Z;E, the welfare e®ects of eliminating
the policy is even more negative by an order of magnitude. This welfare e®ect, however, does
not come from agents losing GHI, but rather from falling into the income process of those agents
who were without GHI in the benchmark, which has a signi¯cantly lower average income.
Also notice that this transition matrix implicitly assumes the GHI loss due to the supply side
e®ect of the tax policy change is a) equally distributed among income groups and b) iid across
time. Both assumptions will give the policy change the possible chance to improve welfare,
because according to Gruber and Lettau (2004), the GHI losses will occur disproportionately
among lower income agents. Moreover, the GHI losses will likely be persistent rather than than
iid. One can thus interpret the welfare loss we found in the experiment as a lower bound.
38Table 1: Parameters of the model
Parameter Description Values
Preferences
¯ discount factor 0.934
¾ relative risk aversion 3.0
Technology and production
® capital share 0.33
± depreciation rate of capital 0.06
Government
fa0;a1;a2g income tax parameters (progressive part) f0.258,0.768,0.716g
¿y income tax parameter (proportional part) 4.456%
¹ c social insurance minimum consumption 23.9% of average earnings
¿ss social security tax rate 10.61%
Social security replacement ratio 45%
qmed(x) Medicare coverage ratio see text
¿med Medicare tax rate 1.51%
pmed Medicare premium 2.11% of per capita output
Demographics
½o aging probability 2.22%
½d death probability after retirement 8.89%
Health insurance
q(x) coverage ratio see text
p group insurance premium 6.2% of average earnigns ($2,018)
Ã group insurance premium covered by a ¯rm (%) 80%
ÁI, ÁG premium mark-up 11%
39Table 2: Experiment A: abolishing deductibility of group insurance premium from income and








Agg. output 1.0000 1.0027
Agg. capital 1.0000 1.0081
Agg. consumption 1.0000 1.0038
Interest rate 4.993% 4.934%
Wage rate (w) 1.0000 1.0027
O®er cost (cE) 1.0000 0.3585




Social ins. covered 1.0000 1.0328
CEV from transition
all (young) - -0.335%
young w/ GHI o®er - -0.462%
young w/o GHI o®er - -0.118%















40Table 3: Other experiments
Benchmark B C D-1 D-2
p $2,018 $2,013 $2,017 $2,016 $2,016
TURall 75.67% 75.98% 89.76% 94.52% 90.47%
TURnoG 35.54% 35.44% 73.81% 86.74% 75.74%
TURG 99.04% 99.60% 99.04% 99.06% 99.06%
Group 99.04% 99.60% 99.04% 99.06% 99.06%
Individual 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Agg. output 1.0000 0.9991 0.9977 0.9941 0.9947
Agg. capital 1.0000 0.9971 0.9931 0.9823 0.9841
Agg. consumption 1.0000 0.9991 0.9973 0.9938 0.9949
Interest rate 4.993% 5.015% 5.045% 5.126% 5.112%
Wage rate (w) 1.0000 0.9991 0.9977 0.9941 0.9947
O®er cost (cE) 1.0000 1.0029 0.9995 0.9990 0.9990
Avg Labor Inc 1.0000 0.9989 0.9972 0.9939 0.9945
¿y 4.456% 4.456% 4.722% 5.106% 4.873%
¿ss 10.607% 10.607% 10.680% 10.607% 10.607%
¿med 1.505% 1.507% 1.521% 1.518% 1.517%
Social ins. covered 1.0000 1.0009 0.9854 0.9697 0.9713
CEV from transition
all (young) - 0.073% 0.241% 0.583% 0.554%
young w/ GHI o®er - 0.062% 0.159% 0.371% 0.387%
young w/o GHI o®er - 0.092% 0.381% 0.946% 0.840%
%w=CEV > 0 (young) - 79.90% 79.79% 99.25% 99.86%
TUR by z
z1 32.34% 33.95% 57.22% 77.41% 77.18%
z2 70.74% 70.70% 93.47% 96.59% 92.78%
z3 88.44% 88.43% 99.44% 99.39% 94.31%
z4 93.60% 93.53% 99.88% 99.89% 93.79%
z5 94.62% 94.64% 99.97% 99.98% 94.81%
TUR by x
x1 76.70% 77.03% 90.07% 97.57% 93.94%
x2 75.03% 75.45% 90.24% 96.18% 91.94%
x3 75.05% 75.44% 90.08% 94.58% 90.26%
x4 75.17% 75.42% 89.70% 92.89% 88.57%
x5 76.16% 76.31% 88.96% 91.37% 87.40%
x6 76.83% 76.96% 87.88% 89.84% 86.53%
x7 77.14% 77.25% 86.28% 87.74% 85.35%
B: abolish group insurance deductibility from income tax base and provide credit for group
insurance at the average income tax rate
C: extend the same deduction for the purchase of individual insurance
D-1: provide credit of $1,000 for the purchase of individual insurance if no access to group
insurance
D-2: same as D-1 but the subsidy is subject to annual income < $30,000
41Table 4: Robustness analysis: supply side response
A (i) (ii) (iii)
Benchmark Baseline no adj. ext. int
p $2,018 $5,316 $3,029 $3,028 $5,317
TURall 75.67% 48.35% 60.90% 58.34% 48.58%
TURnoG 35.54% 38.00% 35.78% 37.32% 36.08%
TURG 99.04% 57.38% 75.52% 76.69% 55.86%
Group 99.04% 17.56% 55.07% 55.01% 17.57%
Individual 0.00% 39.82% 20.46% 21.68% 39.29%
Agg. output 1.0000 1.0027 1.0017 1.0020 1.0026
Agg. capital 1.0000 1.0081 1.0053 1.0060 1.0078
Agg. consumption 1.0000 1.0038 1.0023 1.0027 1.0035
Interest rate 4.993% 4.934% 4.954% 4.950% 4.937%
Wage rate (w) 1.0000 1.0027 1.0018 1.0020 1.0026
O®er cost (cE) 1.0000 0.3585 0.8345 0.8332 0.3585
Avg Labor Inc 1.0000 1.0236 1.0076 1.0115 1.0219
¿y 4.456% 3.742% 3.752% 3.754% 3.741%
¿ss 10.607% 10.531% 10.454% 10.473% 10.523%
¿med 1.505% 1.458% 1.471% 1.468% 1.459%
Social ins. covered 1.0000 1.0328 1.0091 1.0203 1.0259
CEV from transition
all (young) - -0.335% -0.162% -0.205% -0.342%
young w/ GHI o®er - -0.462% -0.244% -0.297% -0.468%
young w/o GHI o®er - -0.118% -0.022% -0.046% -0.124%
%w=CEV > 0 (young) - 19.20% 23.93% 19.49% 19.20%
TUR by z
z1 32.34% 25.02% 28.58% 27.00% 26.09%
z2 70.74% 42.72% 53.67% 51.23% 42.72%
z3 88.44% 64.97% 74.79% 73.58% 63.75%
z4 93.60% 60.58% 77.06% 73.56% 61.37%
z5 94.62% 49.12% 71.32% 67.26% 49.60%
TUR by x
x1 76.70% 50.88% 52.84% 53.27% 50.52%
x2 75.03% 45.40% 54.45% 53.05% 45.08%
x3 75.05% 44.69% 60.91% 57.76% 44.55%
x4 75.17% 46.13% 67.25% 62.73% 46.56%
x5 76.16% 53.09% 70.10% 65.24% 54.93%
x6 76.83% 58.45% 71.32% 67.50% 59.91%














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































43Figure 1: Take-up ratios over income z (model and data)































Figure 2: Take-up ratios over expenditures xy (model and data)































44Figure 3: Take-up ratios over income z for agents with GHI o®er (model and data)































Figure 4: Take-up ratios over expenditures xy for agents with GHI o®er (model and data)































45Figure 5: Take-up ratios over income z for agents without GHI o®er (model and data)































Figure 6: Take-up ratios over expenditures xy for agents without GHI o®er (model and data)
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